Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International
Journal
Volume 2

Issue 3

Article 3

November 2007

A Calamity in the Neighborhood: Women's Participation in the
Rwandan Genocide
Reva N. Adler
Cyanne E. Loyle
Judith Globerman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp

Recommended Citation
Adler, Reva N.; Loyle, Cyanne E.; and Globerman, Judith (2007) "A Calamity in the Neighborhood: Women's
Participation in the Rwandan Genocide," Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal: Vol.
2: Iss. 3: Article 3.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol2/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Scholar Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal by an authorized editor of
Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

A Calamity in the Neighborhood: Women’s
Participation in the Rwandan Genocide
Reva N Adler
Department of Medicine, University of British Columbia,
Cyanne E Loyle
PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of
Maryland and
Judith Globerman
Institute for Health Promotion Research, University of British
Columbia
Although public-health-based violence-prevention trials have been successful in a
variety of high-risk settings, no study has addressed the prevention of genocide, a
form of population-based catastrophic violence. In addition, little is known about
women who participate in genocide, including women’s motivations for active
participation in hands-on battery, assault, or murder. In order to explain why
women assaulted or murdered targeted victims during the 1994 Rwandan
Genocide, we interviewed ten Rwandan female genocide perpetrators living in
prisons and communities in six Rwandan provinces in 2005. Respondents’
narratives reveal two distinct pictures of life in Rwanda, separated by an abrupt
transition: Life prior to 6 April 1994 and Life during the 1994 genocide (6 April–15
July 1994). In addition, respondents described four experiential pressures that
shaped their choices to participate in the 1994 genocide: (1) a disaster mentality;
(2) fear of the new social order; (3) confusion or ambivalence about events on the
ground; and (4) consonance and dissonance with gender roles. The unique
combination of these factors that motivated each female genocide participant in
Rwanda in 1994 would shift and evolve with new situations. These findings may
have implications for understanding and preventing catastrophic violence in other
high-risk jurisdictions.

Introduction
Deaths due to genocide have exceeded war-related deaths in every historical period,
and were eight-fold higher in the twentieth century than in the sixty-nine preceding
centuries.1 This pattern has persisted into the twenty-first century as attacks on
civilians by governments and insurgents continue around the world.2 The rate of
genocide-related mortality is extremely high, far greater than rates for other global
pandemics, including HIV/AIDS and malaria.3 The health sequelae for survivors of
genocide include solid organ disease; neurological dysfunction; and psychiatric illness
that may be chronic, lifelong, and intergenerational, increasing the burden of disease
in affected communities for decades after the killing has ended.4 In order to accelerate
death and injury within victimized groups, genocidal regimes often target health-care
infrastructure and personnel for destruction,5 rendering them powerless to address
even basic public-health requirements amidst spiraling need. The global health
economy is invariably strained when scarce international resources are diverted out of
a necessity to address pressing crises in conflict zones.6
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The past fifteen years have seen at least three major episodes of genocide in close
succession; the most recent, in Darfur, continues at present without resolution or
international agreement on a strategy for peace.7 At the outbreak of each new event,
health professionals, researchers, and educators have called for diplomatic, military,
and humanitarian intercession when violence is imminent or when it is first
unleashed.8 Within a public-health construct, this form of intervention is known as
secondary prevention and falls into much the same category as urgent care in a
hospital for someone having a heart attack. This form of intervention may prevent the
death of the patient, and may ameliorate some disabilities when a problem is well
established, but, by definition, it cannot prevent the underpinning health problem
from developing. Secondary prevention of any problem is predictably expensive, as it is
an unplanned emergency response and relies heavily on costly technology and
personnel in accomplishing its goals.
As the science of violence prevention enters the global health mainstream, such
international organizations as the World Health Organization (in the World Report
on Violence and Health) and the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (in their report The Responsibility to Protect) have accelerated calls
for the primary prevention of extreme collective violence by studying its root causes
and developing anticipatory interventions that prevent extreme violence from
erupting.9 Primary prevention programs lower the likelihood of health problems by
addressing specific risk factors that contribute to those problems, years in advance of
untoward consequences. Using the example of heart attack, primary prevention would
include early diagnosis and treatment of problems that contribute to the development
of heart disease over the long term, such as high blood pressure and high cholesterol.
Universally, primary prevention is more effective and less expensive than secondary
methods, as it is a carefully planned response, addresses problems that are cheaper
and easier to treat, and forestalls the costly disability associated with entrenched
pathology.
One approach to the primary prevention of genocide, suggested by successful
public-health violence-prevention trials in a number of other high-risk milieus such
as prisons10 and inner-city neighborhoods,11 is based on identifying behavioral
and attitudinal risk factors for violence among individuals and groups years before
turmoil arises, then ‘‘treating’’ these risk factors through programs of family,
classroom, community, and media-based education.12 The goal of violence-prevention
programs is to lower the risk for hands-on violence among average community
members and groups during times of social upheaval. To optimize efficacy, such
initiatives are customarily developed to be synergistic with structural efforts to lower
violence, such as improved policing, criminal penalties, and betterment of social
conditions.
There have been few studies addressing the attitudes and beliefs that lead average
citizens to attack or kill unarmed civilians when goaded by genocidal regimes, and no
study to date has targeted modifying such risks in nations known to be at high risk for
catastrophic violence. Much of the published material in this area has been theoretical
or observational in design, and few authors have conducted research directly with
persons who have committed hands-on violence during a genocide or other forms
of catastrophic violence.13 This neglected avenue of inquiry is a critical element of
an interdisciplinary, inclusive approach to genocide prevention and provides the
foundation for the research discussed here.
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The women’s interviews conducted for the study Addressing the Root Causes of
Genocide, Phase 1 (ARC-G Phase 1), are analyzed in this article. The intellectual
framework for ARC-G, discussed in detail elsewhere,14 may be briefly summarized as
four interrelated segments:
Phase 1: To identify the attitudinal risk factors for genocidal violence among
individuals and groups in a retrospective sample of genocide perpetrators
in Rwanda
Phase 2: To identify the same risk factors, in real time, in a sample of persons at high
risk for genocidal behavior at present
Phase 3: To craft and implement public-health-based programs to lower the risks of
violence in the population described in Phase 2
Phase 4: To evaluate and refine Phase 3 interventions

The specific aims of the women’s subset of ARC-G Phase 1 (ARC-G Phase 1W) were
to (a) develop a theoretical model explaining why rank-and-file Rwandan women
assaulted or murdered targeted victims during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide
and (b) identify a group of attitudinal risk factors for genocidal behavior in
individuals and groups that would have the potential to be modified in long-range
public-health-based initiatives directed at preventing genocide in future high-risk
settings.

Background and Context
Worldwide, most crimes against the person are perpetrated by men.15 As a result,
genocide is more often than not characterized as a male crime,16 the outcome of
contemporary notions of masculinity,17 and, by some authors, as a specifically
gendered form of catastrophic violence.18 In contrast, women are frequently portrayed
as victims of genocide—through structural violence endangering the many domains of
human security, through interpersonal violence resulting in injury or death, and
through sexual violence that may be either random or organized.19
It follows, therefore, that the investigators who have explored the motivations of
genocide perpetrators have focused principally on male participants.20 Much less is
known about women who participate in genocide, including the structural circumstances that lead women to perpetrate genocide-related crimes, women’s roles in
initiating and sustaining catastrophic violence, and women’s motivations for active
participation in hands-on battery, assault, or murder.
Recent scholarship has attempted to elucidate the global macro-environment
surrounding many of the international episodes of catastrophic violence that occurred
between 1990 and 2000. For example, the collective violence in the African Great
Lakes region in the 1990s may, in part, be traced to the increase in structural violence
experienced in that region during the preceding decades. A steep rise in oil prices
during the 1970s gave way to a global economic downturn, falling commodity prices,
increasing national debts, and structural adjustment.21 These trends had a
disproportionate impact on poorer countries, contributing to crises of legitimacy
among ruling elites.22
The results of such global pressures on the security environment within tenuous or
failing states are numerous. In an environment of economic recession and vanishing
employment, leaders may choose to entice unemployed young men into military
service, while at the same time making scapegoats of minority groups in an attempt to
divert attention away from government culpability.23 Authors point to premonitory
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increases in arms stockpiles, the expansion of traditional military forces, and the
amplification of exclusionary or divisive ideology as signaling impending collective
conflict.24 The national consciousness may become focused on ethnic ‘‘purity,’’ or on
cleansing the nation of persons seen as alien or as dangerous to the nation’s vitality.25
Men may be called upon to fight or kill for the sake of ‘‘the nation’’ but, most
especially, to kill to protect women and children, who are envisioned in the national
consciousness as defenseless non-combatants. Women, on the other hand, may be
called upon to support sons, brothers, and partners in their masculine role as
‘‘defenders of national security.’’
These conditions were no less present in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994, during
the period of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invasion from Uganda and the
introduction of a multi-party political system by the 1991 constitution.26 However,
evidence from the Rwandan Genocide compels us to re-examine the specific roles of
women in collective ethnic violence.
Women’s involvement in the planning and implementation of the 1994 genocide at
all societal levels has been well described.27 Women’s participation ranged from
working as main architects of the violence to acting as individual killers in small
communities. Most commonly, women denounced victims and looted victims’ homes as
well as their bodies.28 Much less frequently, women killed directly, with a variety of
modern and more traditional weaponry.29
This characterization of women’s participation is supported by available statistics.
Only one woman, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, has been indicted by the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), on charges that she incited troops to rape and
kill hundreds of women in the university town of Butare during the genocide; her trial
continues at the time of writing.30 Statistics from the Rwandan justice system indicate
that in 2004 approximately 3,000 women, representing some 3.4% of the Rwandan
prison population, were incarcerated in Rwandan prisons for genocide-related crimes;
the significant majority of these women have been charged either as accomplices to
murder or assault (for denouncing victims or roaming with attack groups) or as thieves
(for looting during the genocide). There have been no judicial executions in Rwanda
since 1998; only six women (0.2%) in total have been sentenced to death for genociderelated crimes, and only one woman was in fact executed. The acquittal rate for women
charged with genocide-related crimes is 40%.31
A comparison to statistics for men in Rwanda makes clear the differences in handson involvement in the 1994 genocide. For example, in 2002 alone, 1,909 men were
adjudicated for genocide-related crimes dating to 1994; seventy (3.6%) received the
death penalty, and 528 (27.6%) were acquitted.32 In 1998, twenty-one Rwandan men
were found guilty of genocide-related crimes, sentenced to death, and publicly
executed.33
Much of what we know about female genocide participants in all of these realms
has been gathered from the eyewitness accounts of victims and bystanders; little has
come from the perpetrators themselves. ARC-G Phase 1W was designed to address this
gap, as well as to explore the thoughts, feelings, attitudes, and beliefs of women who
perpetrated hands-on violence during the Rwandan Genocide.

Methods
Study Design and Participants
The sample was designed to represent the rank-and-file population of civilian women
who participated in crimes against the person but were not political, military, or
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Figure 1. Research sites (on map of Rwanda with 2005 provincial borders)37
attack-group leaders during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. The method used was
grounded theory, a qualitative technique used to form a testable theory about the
phenomena being studied based on the constant comparison of data within participant
interviews. At the conclusion of theoretical sampling, ten women who confessed to or
were convicted of Category 2 (murder) or Category 3 (assault) genocide crimes under
Rwandan law participated in the study. Study participants ranged from adolescence to
middle age in 1994. The sample comprised both urban and rural dwellers. In keeping
with grounded theory, sampling concluded when all categories of interest were
saturated (i.e., when researchers deemed that no new information on a particular
phenomenon was emerging from subsequent interviews). Theoretical sampling was
employed to capture target-population diversity. Selective and discriminate sampling
was used to ensure exploration of evolving patterns. In accordance with the constant
comparative method, new interviewees were identified to expand upon emergent and
absent themes.34
Because rates of literacy35 and telephone ownership36 are low in Rwanda, thirdparty opinion leaders in prisons and communities in six Rwandan provinces—Kigali,
Kigali Ngali, Gitarama, Ruhengeri, Kibuye, and Gikongoro (see Figure 1)—recruited
study participants by word of mouth between February and April 2005. Opinion
leaders gave or read invitation letters to community members who met the study
criteria and obtained verbal permission for researchers to approach potential
participants in person (as none had phones or postal access). Interested individuals
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were provided with further information by the study team and given at least twentyfour hours to consider their participation. All study participants took part in informed
consent procedures under a UBC Behavioural Research Ethics Board certificate.

Interviewers and Interview Procedures
The interview team, whose members were supervised during data collection, consisted
of five trained, multilingual interviewers self-identifying as members of either Hutu or
Tutsi cultural groups and originating from four of Rwanda’s ten provinces according to
1994 boundaries. Data collection was carried out via a two-hour face-to-face semistructured interview, using Grant McCracken’s long interview method.38 The interview guide was developed based on previous participant observation, key informant
interviews, a focus group, and pilot interviews and took a ‘‘life history’’ format. The
interview guide evolved as the interviews progressed to test and confirm emerging
themes and patterns.
All interviews were audio-recorded. Because audio-recording is prohibited inside
Rwandan prisons, special arrangements were made with the Ministry of the Interior to
interview prisoners in offices attached to but not officially located within the prison
enclosure. Interviews were conducted in the language of choice of the participant,
which for all participants was Kinyarwanda. Once interviews were completed, a
separate team of multilingual translators listened to the audio-recordings and, in a
single step, transcribed the interviews and translated them into English. Backtranslation, retranslation, and spot-check translation were used to optimize
precision.39

Data Analysis
Transcribed audio-recordings were loaded into Atlas.ti software and analyzed by two
researchers. Transcripts were examined according to McCracken’s method, using an
editing approach to text analysis in five stages:
(1) Detailed examination of individual transcripts for statements treated
independently of each other
(2) Analysis of individual statements for meaning
(3) Identification of themes and patterns
(4) Search for inter-theme consistency and contradictions
(5) comparison of themes between interviews).40
Following analysis of each transcript and development of data codes, the research
team identified and tested emergent theory.41

Results
Participant characteristics are shown in Table 1. All respondents reporting ‘‘no
income’’ were students. No participant experienced prolonged food insecurity in 1994.
Respondents’ narratives reveal two distinct pictures of life in Rwanda, separated by an
abrupt transition: Life prior to 6 April 1994 and Life during the 1994 genocide (6 April–
15 July 1994). For each time period, respondents described a distinct set of
environmental themes underpinning their everyday lives and thereby informing
their beliefs, behavior, and decisions. In addition, respondents described four
experiential pressures that shaped their choices to participate in the 1994 genocide:
(1) a disaster mentality; (2) fear of the new social order; (3) confusion or ambivalence
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Table 1. Demographic characteristics of ARC-G Phase 1W respondents
Respondents
(N ¼ 10)
Age (years)
Range
Median
Mean
Residence
Urban
Rural
Marital Status
Single
Married
Ethnicity
Tutsi
Hutu
Education (years)
Range
Median
Mean
Annual Income (1993 $US)
Range
Median
Mean
Occupation
Farmer/landowner/herder
Student
Merchant at market
Accountant
Civil servant

15–53
17.5
22.5
5
5
5
5
1
9
1–16
6
5.8
0–2315.00
0
534.57
5
2
1
1
1

about events on the ground; and (4) consonance and dissonance with gender roles.
The environmental themes reported here were influential among individuals and
groups not only during the genocide but also for years before it started and, most
likely, for years afterward. Experiential pressures emerged during the early days of
the genocide and, for some respondents, persist into the present day. The unique
combination of these factors that motivated each female genocide participant in
Rwanda in 1994 would shift and evolve with new situations.

A Brief Description of Study Participants
Respondent 1:
Respondent
Respondent
Respondent
Respondent

2:
3:
4:
5:

A student who led the Interahamwe (Hutu Power militia) to a house
where victims were living
A student who participated as a witness in an attack group
A teenaged farmer who denounced victims being hidden by her family
A teenaged farmer who denounced a child hiding in her neighborhood
A teenager who denounced a friend from school who was hiding in the
bush
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Respondent 6:
Respondent 7:
Respondent 8:
Respondent 9:
Respondent 10:

A middle-class businesswomen who did not want to discuss the crimes
she was charged with
An Interahamwe member who admits to murdering targeted victims
during the genocide
A merchant who denounced roommates
A local official who distributed weapons and detained victims
An educated worker in a large business who denounced neighbors

Environmental Themes
Life prior to 6 April 1994
Under Rwandan law prior to 1994, men sat as heads of household and women were
barred from inheriting property, entering into any legal agreement, or opening a
bank account without spousal permission. On average, women were less educated than
men, and few women held positions of authority within any echelon of government.42
In Rwandan communities prior to 1994, gender roles for women emphasized hard
work without complaint, homemaking, rearing and disciplining children, faithfulness
to partners, and (for women with farms or gardens) making a success of subsistence
agriculture. Some authors point to subtle changes in the conception of ‘‘femininity’’ in
Rwanda starting with the national pogroms of 1973, when women first participated in
‘‘national security’’ activities by harassing, denouncing, or assaulting Tutsi women
in their schools, workplaces, and communities.43 Nonetheless, the majority of
Rwandan women in 1994 adhered to the traditional expectations of homemaking,
childrearing, and creating community between households.
On the other hand, men were seen as family ‘‘breadwinners.’’ Rwandan men were
respected for ‘‘observing much and saying little,’’ providing financially for their wives,
educating their children, protecting their families, and defending their communities
(from external threats as well as from more commonplace violence). Men made up the large
majority of Rwandan soldiers, legislators, and municipal officials. Men were responsible
for most national and local security functions before and during the 1994 genocide.
The narratives of female participants in the Rwandan Genocide elaborate a picture
of Rwandan life before 1994 that was centered on close-knit neighborhoods, community
cohesion, and the principle of mutual aid. Families, regardless of ethnicity, cooperated
with each other in cultivating crops, maintaining infrastructure, and sharing
resources in good times; in times of emergency, they relied on one another to share
food when crops failed, and to support widows and orphans in need:
Respondent 4:

Respondent 10:

We invited each other to help in cultivating one’s piece of land in
turns. We invited each other to weddings and even helped each other
in hard times, such as carrying the sick to hospital or burying the
dead . . .
We got along with our neighbors. We had no problem with them. We
shared what we had. I used to call some of them my fathers-in-law
and my godmothers. I felt I was really in a family.

Although most respondents describe a life free of ethnic considerations or conflicts,
women from the north of Rwanda (where the ruling MRND party originated) report
a background regional climate based on exclusionary ideology and ‘‘hidden’’ ethnic
tensions:
Respondent 8:

Young people weren’t allowed to marry Tutsis, and leaders discouraged
such weddings.
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Respondent 6:

Before the genocide, people were interacting, but not satisfactorily.
The war that broke out in 1994 had also broken out in the 1960s and
1959, and it just kept on going, though some people tried to hide it. So,
whenever and wherever you went to settle down, you could see that
ethnic considerations were instilled in the people . . .

When the RPF invaded Rwanda in 1990, few respondents noted any change in
day-to-day community relationships, although northerners, along with residents of
Kigali, report that prominent Tutsis, as well as families whose children had
left Rwanda to join the RPF, were gradually marginalized as ‘‘enemy collaborators.’’
Tutsi and Hutu supporters of the RPF were forced underground:
Respondent 8:

After the Inkotanyi [the RPF] invaded the country, Tutsis were no
longer respected as people who had rights as citizens.
Respondent 6: The people who wanted to follow the RPF political party working
outside of the country had to do it secretly . . . We simply felt that we
had been invaded by inyenzi [cockroaches].

With the introduction of multi-party politics in Rwanda in 1991 tensions within
communities intensified, both between Rwandan ethnic groups and also among
members of the same ethnic group who joined different political parties. Animations
(political rallies aimed at recruiting and ‘‘energizing’’ party members) became common
in most parts of the country. Battles over political influence frequently turned violent.
However, although Tutsi Rwandans became more of a national target during this
period, respondents report that relationships between neighbors of all ethnic groups
remained more or less intact:
Respondent 1: Let me say a bit about the multi-party period, just before the killings
started. At that time, there were many parties, all of them officially
sanctioned, but the members of one party would attack members of
another simply because they were jealous that certain parties were
attracting more members.. . . This was all about jealousy and greed.
Respondent 7: We [neighbors] interacted agreeably and we had no misunderstandings, but thereafter we disengaged ourselves. This problem arose
because of our political involvements.

Political discord on the community level also divided some families:
Respondent 3:

My dad had nothing against [Tutsis], but my brother was against
Tutsis because he was with the killers . . . People used to call Tutsis
inyenzi [cockroaches], but in my family Tutsis were respected . . . My
dad used to tell us that he didn’t believe what people were saying
about Tutsis, and that they were human beings like us, and that it
wasn’t true that they wanted to kill Hutus.

Life during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide
The narratives of our respondents change abruptly as they begin to speak about
6 April 1994, when the plane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana
(as well as the president of Burundi, Cyprian Ntayamira), was shot down. Respondents
experienced this event as a critical assault on national sovereignty, placing Rwanda in
an official state of emergency. Interim government leaders swiftly moved to blame the
incident on the RPF,44 and all Rwandan Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus were
just as swiftly labeled ‘‘enemy collaborators.’’
The downing of Habyarimana’s plane had the immediate effect of increasing the
militarization of the entire country, a move pre-planned by Hutu Power militants
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months earlier.45 Militarization was framed as critical to ‘‘national security’’ and
encompassed not only the armed forces but also a large proportion of Rwandan civil
society. Over the next months, men and boys without military experience were recruited,
trained, cajoled, and coerced to join civilian militias acting as extensions of the Rwandan
military. In early April, the Rwandan armed forces, civilian militias, and their local
supporters proceeded to round up and kill Tutsi men as well as prominent opponents of
the Hutu Power movement. Later, women, girls, and younger children were also targeted.
As for the rest of the population, non-targeted civilians, particularly women and children,
were instructed to remain indoors and ‘‘out of harm’s way.’’
Respondent 8:

News of the death of the president begun to spread the following
morning, and the Interahamwe were going around telling people that
their enemies had killed their president. Leaders ordered people not to
leave their houses.
Respondent 9: Personally, I never knew that a war would start. We shared everything,
and then abruptly we heard that they had shot down Habyarimana’s
plane. I think this was the cause of the killings that took place.
Respondent 2: People used to say that Tutsis were spying for the Inkotanyi [the RPF]
and that the Inkotanyi wanted to kill Hutus . . . Sometimes people said
they were killing inyenzi [cockroaches], as if they were not killing
human beings, and that to kill Tutsis was like self defense, because
people were saying that Tutsis were about to kill Hutus.

After early April 2004, governance in Rwanda devolved to a complex network of
government, military, and Interahamwe extremists working in loose affiliation, as well
as individually, at national, regional, and local levels. During the genocide, ad hoc
leaders in all social strata mobilized citizens to denounce, rob, and kill targeted Tutsi
and Hutu victims—by planning and importing weapons from abroad, by assassinating
formal leaders who would not cooperate with the Hutu Power agenda, by commanding
the Rwandan armed forces and Interahamwe militias to attack and kill unarmed
civilians, by disseminating misinformation about the RPF and Tutsi civilians at the
national and local levels, and by bribing and coercing average civilians to participate in
the mayhem. The impact of manipulative and destructive leadership on the attitudes,
beliefs, and behavior of most Rwandans during the genocide was noted by a large
majority of respondents:
Respondent 4:

I think it’s the leadership that was in place [that is to blame for the
genocide], because if they had punished those who killed first as an
example, the killings wouldn’t have escalated. However, the leaders in
place then were very greedy people, and they wanted to stay in power.
[Interviewer]: Who do you think could have stopped the killings but did nothing . . . ?
Respondent 7: The leaders, because they helped us and incited us to continue the
killings, while they were the ones who were supposed to condemn such
atrocious acts.
Respondent 8: Let me tell you, leaders played a big role in the killings, because they
came and told us that our Tutsi neighbors were going to kill us, and
that [the Tutsis] had guns in their houses . . . In addition, many of us
were poor, and [our leaders] were telling us that we could keep our
neighbors’ belongings.

Experiential Pressures: Explaining Calamity
As previously mentioned, the female respondents who participated in ARC-G Phase
1W describe four distinct experiential pressures driving their decisions to participate
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in hands-on violence after the death of Habyarimana: (1) a disaster mentality, (2) fear
of the new social order, (3) confusion or ambivalence about events on the ground, and
(4) consonance and dissonance with gender roles. Each of these will be discussed here
in some detail.

Disaster Mentality
Within hours of the downing of Habyarimana’s plane at Kanombe Airport, women
report, many sectors of Rwandan society went into an immediate state of crisis.
A large proportion of female respondents describe knowing that something devastating
had happened not only to their country but also to their communities and their
everyday lives. Faced with this unparalleled disaster, and fearing that Rwanda was
ungovernable without Habyarimana, most respondents felt the urgency of finding
new answers to their predicament.
This omnipresent mood of disaster had a variety of effects on the emotional
states of respondents; some report feeling unnerved or panicky, while others felt
despondent and hopeless. Still other respondents remember feeling outraged; they
quickly moved to revenge Habyarimana’s death by attacking unarmed Tutsi civilians,
all of whom the government characterized as RPF collaborators and thereby
responsible for the death of the president.
Respondent 7:

I heard on the radio how the plane was shot down, that citizens weren’t
supposed to scatter and a curfew was imposed . . . After hearing this, I
never left home, thinking that if I did I would die, leaving my kids to be
orphans, which wouldn’t have been the right thing to do.
Respondent 6: The average person wanted to die, for life had become meaningless.
Can you imagine seeing a man slaughtering his fellow men? . . . The
country you saw, it belonged to the beasts.
Respondent 8: We people [from the north and west of Rwanda], we were really sad
because we had lost our president, who was so important to us . . . and
we were revenging his death. People from other regions were jealous of
us [because President Habyarimana had favored people from his own
northwestern origins] and we knew it, so when the president died we
felt as if they were in one way or another responsible . . . People really
hated Tutsis because everyone knew that they were in support of
Inkotanyi. We thought that Tutsis would all be killed, and that nothing
would happen afterwards, that no one would be punished for having
killed them.

Fear of the New Social Order
Rwanda’s social fabric deteriorated in the post-Habyarimana period, as violence
accelerated into chaos. Many respondents describe a social environment that was
incomprehensible, dangerous, and terrifying; despite the advancing RPF and ubiquitous
anti-Tutsi rhetoric, women most feared fellow Hutus involved in genocidal activities.
Respondent 4:

Respondent 6:

I was terrified because there were screaming and wailing all over the
place, and whistles were blown and men ordered to go to night patrols
and roadblocks . . . I even asked why they were killing the Tutsis and
they told me that Tutsis had to die. I always thought that [Tutsis] were
innocent and being victimized.
Whenever something made a slight noise, you felt [the extremists] were
coming to kidnap you. You could see abducted people being led
away . . . You felt you could not believe anyone. You did not even
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understand how such things could be happening. Things were
unbelievable. What happened in April was extremely bad.

Although women were directed to remain at home, they were also expected to
maintain the traditional female roles of running the household, caring for children,
and supporting the men of the family, all in increasingly perilous surroundings.
Obtaining food and water became progressively more dangerous amid escalating
community violence, and women had difficulty moving about freely for fear of being
injured or killed in the melee. This had a multiplicative effect on women, who felt
increasingly under threat even though they were not members of targeted minority
groups.
Respondent 1:

. . . The place where we used to fetch water was too far away and we
were supposed to pass by roadblocks. The document certifying that I
didn’t have a national identity card (because I was a minor) was denied
to me. So one day, they arrested me and ordered me to sit at the
roadblock where they asked me a lot of questions trying to find out if I
was really Hutu.
Respondent 2: My role was that I witnessed people killing someone . . . I saw a group of
people going down to the river with a man and [I saw them] kill him
there . . . Of course, there were people who just watched others being
killed, and had the means to save them [but did nothing].
Respondent 2: I think [people] were afraid to stop the killings, fearing to be associated
with Tutsis.

Some respondents found it necessary to find new ways to ensure their safety as
well as to procure the necessities of life for themselves and their families.
Respondent 1:

The following day, a soldier, whom I knew, came and said, ‘‘I don’t want
you to be short of water. That’s why I suggest you always to go with our
people’’ . . . I was scared. The following day he told me, ‘‘Before you fetch
water, come to see me so I can lend you my military shirt.’’ So I agreed.
I put that shirt on every time I needed to fetch water. I always went
with his people. Sometimes, it was very hard to pass depending on
which Interahamwe were on the road . . . Some of them were more
terrible than soldiers.

Confusion or Ambivalence about Events on the Ground
Homebound and fearful, Rwandan women faced significant obstacles when they tried
to gather information and frame opinions about the escalating violence in their
communities. This, in turn, placed women at a disadvantage in trying to construct a
comprehensive picture of their ‘‘new world,’’ as well as in making informed decisions
about their personal actions under the circumstances.
Respondent 1:

. . . Women and girls are supposed to stay at home and look after the
house. Men are the people who spend all their time walking and going
to bars . . . People say that a lot of things [during the genocide] took
place in bars. In Rwandan culture, no woman can spend a night in a
bar. I think the difference lies in the fact that women are supposed to
stay home, but men are always moving.

At the same time, however, women were also expected by armed killers to
participate in the genocide by denouncing victims, looting and burning local
properties, and lending support to the homicidal agenda of extremists. The majority
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describe confusion regarding what to think, how to feel, and whom to believe about
the unfolding genocide.
Respondent 2:

In our area, the situation was normal and calm, but at the end of
April some people started to flee. . . . A few days later some people in
our area started to sing songs about exterminating [Tutsis] . . . I
couldn’t understand how people could kill each other without a reason.
Respondent 1: I heard people saying . . . that [Tutsis] were enemies of the state. . . . The
people being killed were our neighbors, and the family had children I
grew up with, went to school with. . . . So how can someone say that a
fourteen-year-old kid is an enemy of the state? . . . People kept saying
that Tutsis were state enemies, but there was nothing, either in our
conversations or our daily lives, proving that it was true.

Similarly, many respondents describe their involvement during the genocide as
being haphazard or situational, rather than informed by thoughtful deliberation or
strongly held views. Some women describe responding ‘‘in the moment’’ to provocations
for violence, without significant forethought or malice toward victims.
Respondent 5:

There was once when I went to fetch water down a hill [that] I heard
people from across the other hill screaming. Then a girl came running
and she hid in a bush that was nearby. I saw her and didn’t say a
word. . . . I then started heading home, but before reaching home I
encountered some other kids my age who asked me about the
screaming. I told them what had happened [and] where she was
hiding. I didn’t know they would give her up. . . . I went home and after
a short while one of my cousins passed by our compound with the girl
in his arms and [he] . . . killed her. I confessed because I knew that if I
had kept my mouth shut . . . nothing would have happened to her . . .
[Interviewer]: Personally what were your feelings then?
Respondent 5: I was terrified and miserable.’’
Respondent 3: My dad’s Tutsi friend was hiding in our house and they kept asking my
father if that man was there, but always he denied it. One day I told my
brother that the man they were looking for was hiding in our house,
and they went and found him there. . . . I didn’t do it because I hated
him, or Tutsis, but because my brother promised me that he wouldn’t
kill him and gave me some gifts. . . . Eventually they took [my father’s
friend] away and killed [him]. That’s when I started to feel guilty and
my heart was telling me that I had committed a sin.
Respondent 9: A man came with his assault group and I heard that he had family ties
with Habyarimana. He came and said to me severely, ‘‘You, local
leader, I want you to protect these people.’’ I thought that killings
wouldn’t reach our home area. When he came back he gathered the
people in my compound and clubbed them to death. . . . I was shocked
because I didn’t know him and didn’t know his intentions. He went
for one minute and came back. I never knew that he was going to
kill them.

Consonance and Dissonance with Gender-Based Expectations
While many women attribute their involvement in the 1994 genocide to spontaneous
or poorly considered behavior, some participated deliberately and with conviction.
The ambient themes that conditioned Rwandan women to participate willingly in
the genocide, as discussed above and elsewhere, include destructive ideology,
rapid militarization of civil society, fear of extremist governance, greed, and
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overpowering social upheaval. Men and women alike were caught up in the ‘‘total
environment’’ imposed by these mutually reinforcing factors.46
Women participated in the Rwandan Genocide one of two ways: more ‘‘passively,’’ by
cheering killers on, looting property, and denouncing victims; or more ‘‘actively,’’ by
working with attack groups and personally assaulting targeted individuals. The former
group of women, comprising the large majority of willing genocide participants,
conducted themselves within the limits forged during the 1973 pogroms. While remaining
within traditional gender norms with respect to spouse, home, and family, these women
nevertheless lent support to the eliminationist Hutu Power agenda by egging on attack
groups, informing on concealed victims, and pillaging property from the dead.
Women describe being influenced by a subtle and complicated interplay between
accepting their role as homemaker and compliant spouse and, at the same time,
forming and acting on political beliefs in making decisions to participate in genocidal
activities:
Respondent 10: [Women] were supporting their husbands to carry out killings.
You may even find such women here in prison, who defend
themselves by saying, ‘‘My husband was called upon to go to a
road block, and do you think I could stop him?’’ or ‘‘My husband
would ask me for his machete, and I knew where it was, so do
you think I could refuse him?’’ Though you could not avoid doing
it, why did you also cheer [the killers] on, or undress and plunder
the victims? It was because you were happy that [Tutsis] were
dying.
Respondent 8, a woman who reports feeling no personal animosity against Tutsis
prior to the start of the 1990 civil war, is imprisoned for having denounced one of her
Tutsi housemates at the outset of the genocide. Because Respondent 8 worked outside
the home, she witnessed numerous episodes of harassment and arrest in the years
leading up to the genocide and was accustomed to political discussion and debate.
Respondent

8:

Life wasn’t good at all [prior to 1994] because of the
Interahamwe . . . [who] were stealing things from people who were
coming from the market, especially those who looked like
Tutsis . . . If you didn’t have money to pay them they would throw
your goods on the ground . . . I remember during the peace negotiations some leaders used to say that there wasn’t enough space for all
Rwandese, that it would be better if those who were outside the
country did not come back. I think they killed Tutsis who were
inside the country to discourage those who were outside from
returning. Their interest made them to lead people into genocide.

Her family was poor, and Respondent 8 relied on the generosity of her neighbors
to make ends meet. They lived in a neighborhood where Interahamwe also resided,
and she was married to an Interahamwe member who died during the genocide.
Although Respondent 8 never killed anyone herself, she was nevertheless forthright in
describing her belief, in 1994, that all Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus were
potential RPF collaborators and therefore a dangerous threat to the safety of Rwanda
and Rwandans:
I considered them to be my enemies because they had killed our President and now they
wanted to kill us. For me the wisest thing to do was to kill them . . . There were some
Hutus who opposed the government, so they didn’t kill and were treated as traitors, or
spies for the Inkotanyi. I believed what was said about them. I considered them naı̈ve.
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Thus, within the limits of a more traditional gender role, Respondent 8 encouraged
and supported her husband, friends, and neighbors in prosecuting the genocide,
even going so far as to return home, after fleeing her neighborhood for safety, in order
to keep house for her husband:
When the fighting was approaching our neighborhood . . . we decided to go and seek
refuge elsewhere . . . but my husband didn’t stay there for long and he decided to return
home. One day I met him coming to look for me. During the genocide my
husband . . . wanted me back home.

During her interview, this respondent accepted responsibility for her actions and her
contribution to advancing the genocide:
Men were more active in the killings, but women played a big role in the killings as well,
because they could have advised their husbands not to kill innocent people.

Finally, despite constraining her behavior to norms that would have been acceptable
for Hutu women during the 1973 persecution of Tutsis, Respondent 8 did not escape
the scorn of family and society when her crimes became known:
When I went back home, my mother asked me if I wasn’t feeling bad about things that I
did in [the genocide] . . . and I told her that I never did anything bad . . . I don’t know
what they think now. Perhaps they think that I lied to them, [because] they don’t come
to see me.

Those who themselves killed victims were a small minority of Rwanda’s women.
Fewer than one in ten members of the Interahamwe militia were women who received
‘‘civil defense’’ training prior to the genocide. Because participation in hands-on violence
was considered to fall outside gender-based norms for women in 1994, this small group
of women not only took on the role of killer but also faced community censure for
stepping outside traditional gender constraints. Some women who agreed to join the
militias had reputations for challenging limits in other spheres and may have become
involved precisely because of their familiarity with crossing social boundaries.
Respondent

10: There were some bad-mannered girls whose friends were
Interahamwe. They must have walked together with their
Interahamwe boyfriends and thus saw their deeds. When you keep
on exchanging ideas with someone, you may find room within
yourself to accommodate those ideas. That’s why some women
participated in the killings.

Of the ten women whose interviews are analyzed here, Respondent 7 was most
forthcoming in describing the complex relationship between personal and external
pressures driving her decision to kill at the outset of the genocide. Respondent 7 and
her husband both joined the Interahamwe militia in the early 1990s. She reports being
a heavy drinker and marijuana user prior to being recruited, activities that fall outside
of the customary boundaries of ‘‘appropriate’’ behavior among Rwandan women even
today. Respondent 7 received military and weapons instruction prior to the genocide
and was told she was being prepared to go to war as well as to ‘‘exterminate Tutsis.’’
Although never an enthusiastic supporter of Hutu Power herself, she responded to
pressure from her husband to get involved in Interahamwe activities:
Respondent

7: There came a time when [my husband] tried to sensitize me [to Hutu
Power ideology] . . . I then thought, ‘‘this is going to be difficult for
me,’’ but he told me that it was obligatory . . . Personally I never was
on their side, but my husband once said to me, ‘‘If you don’t take
part, I will kill you myself.’’ So I agreed to participate.
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Thus, with military training and a husband committed to the cause, in the early days
of the genocide Respondent 7 agreed to kill a group of targeted civilians in her
neighborhood. Traumatized by her actions and determined not to kill again, she
nonetheless had difficulty withdrawing from Interahamwe attack groups:
They sent me to a homestead while armed with a rifle and when we surrounded the
house I shot . . . people inside. I regretted it after I killed them. I knew that I had done
something wrong and I felt that if I continued killing I would also die. I went home and
told my husband how I had decided not to [kill again]. I told him, ‘‘these were my
neighbors and their deaths have upset me, so I won’t repeat [killing] anywhere else.’’ He
told me then, ‘‘If you don’t continue . . . you will have to die also.’’ . . . Thereafter, I kept
the rifle but avoided him.

Despite accepting non-traditional gender roles ‘‘for the sake of national defense,’’
the few women who did receive militia training were not relieved of their customary
responsibilities at home. Women combatants were expected to fulfill novel and
traditional roles simultaneously, both while training with militias and, later, while
participating in the genocide itself.
Respondent 7:

Although they trained and sensitized me, I was never interested . . . I
was trained for one month and then stopped. They then asked me,
‘‘Have you mastered it?’’ And I said, ‘‘Yes.’’ I went home and continued
my life, but when the war broke out they gave me a rifle and ordered
me to kill people . . .
[Interviewer]: Why did you stop the weapons training sessions?
Respondent 7: I stopped because I had to take care of my children. I left them home
alone and [the Interahamwe] wanted me to train into the evening
hours . . . The kids had nobody to feed them, so I decided to be there for
my children.

Women who joined the Interahamwe placed themselves in a social and gender
stratum without precedent in Rwandan traditions. Burdened with ‘‘double duty,’’
women in the Interahamwe enjoyed neither the stature of full militia members, nor the
welcome of their former supportive communities. It follows that our respondent in the
militias reports feeling isolated from collective society, with few opportunities for
guidance. As a result of such isolation, women who deliberately killed fellow Rwandans
were not at all shielded from the resultant feelings of doubt, regret, or trauma.
Respondent 7:

I always lived with guilt. I always thought about them. I asked myself
why I killed them, but didn’t find a reason, and regretted having done
it . . . I thought, ‘I ‘‘had no conflict with those people I killed, people with
whom I shared even water, and who always chatted with me. Why did I
kill them?’’ I started . . . looking for an elder who might have some
insight into these feelings, and how [the Interahamwe] had incited me
to become involved. But I found that even the elderly were afraid of
being killed, and they wouldn’t talk to me.

Summary
The results of this study reveal that for women, the decision to participate in the
Rwandan Genocide was motivated by a complex interaction between background
environmental themes that had been in play for years and contemporary experiential
pressures that gathered momentum in or around April 1994.
In brief, Rwandan women’s traditional environment of multiethnic, cohesive, and
inter-reliant communities was undermined repeatedly in the postcolonial years and
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faced its greatest challenges between 1990 and 1994, during the RPF invasion,
the implementation of multi-party politics, and the ascendancy of the Hutu Power
movement. However, communities remained essentially intact until the downing
of President Habyarimana’s plane on 6 April 1994, an act that the Rwandan
government blamed on the RPF in order to justify intensive militarization not only of
the armed forces but of civil society as well. From this point on, the Hutu Power
movement’s campaign to eliminate Tutsis and Hutu political opponents engulfed
virtually all social, interpersonal, and experiential aspects of the Rwandan reality,
and this situation prevailed until the end of the war in July 1994.
April 1994 marked the culmination of months of covert planning by extremists;
the reign of terror unleashed against Rwandan Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus
was well organized and pre-planned by Hutu Power leaders. In the interests of
‘‘national security,’’ civilians were called upon to murder Tutsi non-combatants, who
were characterized as enemy collaborators and as a threat to national security.
Average women experienced this as a true catastrophe and had the resultant reactions
of terror, despondency, and, for some, rage and calls for revenge against all Tutsis.
At the same time, women were terrified of the extremists who controlled national
governance and their local communities, fearing that they or their children would
be ensnared in the violence. Many aligned themselves with attack groups for
protection or in order to be less ‘‘visible’’ to the extremists, who were threatening
‘‘Tutsi sympathizers.’’ Others witnessed murders and were too fearful for their own
safety to intervene. Women, who were ordered to stay at home through the crisis, had
limited ability to gather information and thus to frame informed opinions about
the violence unleashed in their communities.
As a result of the limits drawn by gender, some women describe participating in the
genocide without substantial forethought and others describe their actions as
inadvertent. However, some Rwandan women admit to participating deliberately
and after considerable reflection. Such women believed the government propaganda
that all Tutsis were RPF collaborators and spies, plotting with the RPF to murder and
enslave Rwandan Hutus. For women not willing to breach traditional gender roles,
participation was more ‘‘passive,’’ including activities such as looting or denouncing
hidden victims. Other women, perhaps with a history of transgressing gender
boundaries in other aspects of community life, joined attack groups and actively
murdered victims.

Discussion
From these data a picture emerges of how the ‘‘perfect storm’’ of violence came to pass
and why the average Rwandan woman chose to become involved. The factors that were
most influential in motivating each individual to participate evolved with the shifting,
disturbing, and chaotic situation on the ground. Although there is no static case to
draw from, it is possible to derive an aerial overview of why women chose to participate
in the genocide and to understand the unique, gender-related experiences that
informed those choices.
This is the first study to investigate the attitudinal risks for extreme violence that
have the potential to be modified in public-health framework; as a result, there are few
studies in the literature for comparison. However, some parallels may be drawn
between our results and those from related fields of study.
Our finding regarding the sudden shift of women’s attitudes after the 6 April
1994 ‘‘disaster’’ is echoed in the literature on women in neo-Nazi groups in the
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United States. In her interviews with thirty-four female racist activists, Kathleen Blee
reports that for nearly all respondents, the ‘‘conversion’’ to racial activism was
prompted by ‘‘a single dramatic life event,’’47 such as a near-death experience or the
loss of a loved one. Conversion stories took on the quality of moving from ‘‘naiveté to
enlightenment,’’48 much as Rwandan women rapidly aligned themselves with the
Hutu Power movement after the death of Habyarimana.
The situation of Rwandan women in 1994 also resembles the circumstances of
German women during the Third Reich. For example, far fewer women than men were
direct participants in killing during the Nazi Holocaust.49 Similarly, just as their
Rwandan counterparts a half-century later were admonished to stay indoors and take
care of home and family, German women under the Nazis were also encouraged by
official policy to confine their energies to Kinder, Küche, Kirche (children, kitchen,
and church).50 Particularly after 1938, German women were charged with protecting a
peaceful, supportive space for soldiers engaged in emotionally upsetting activities at
the front.51 This concept reaffirms the themes conveyed by Respondents 7 and 8 in this
study, who were expected to manage home and children while at the same time
providing emotional support to husbands who spent their days ‘‘working’’ in attack
groups.
Other resemblances also become apparent. Like our study respondents, some
German women during the Third Reich refrained from forming political opinions,
while others were steadfast supporters of Nazi doctrine and policy.52 In addition,
Rwandan women’s predilection for property crimes during the 1994 genocide was a
reprise of German women’s behavior during the Holocaust. Highly positioned German
women—including Emmy Göring, wife of Chancellor Hermann Göring—engaged in
‘‘high-class’’ theft of the finest goods, homes, and lands expropriated from wealthy
victims, while even ‘‘average’’ women, such as members of the Bund Deutscher Mädel
(League of German Girls) willingly ejected Polish families from their farms, and looted
homesteads for the best equipment, during their campaign to ‘‘resettle’’ ethnic German
families from occupied territories.53
Both German and Rwandan women used genocide as an opportunity to step
outside of traditional constraints and enter the conventional workforce.54 For example,
the demands of rearmament and wartime economy called upon German women to take
on traditionally ‘‘male’’ jobs in increasing numbers after 1936; in 1944, fully 57% of all
German women were employed outside the home. Some wished to better their
circumstances or advance themselves professionally, while others wished to escape the
restraints imposed by more traditional roles. In Rwanda, too, a small number of
women (such as Pauline Nyiramasuhuko) used the genocide as an opportunity to
improve their financial circumstances or to advance ‘‘professionally’’ by assuming
positions of authority during the time of upheaval.
Finally, it appears that the experiences of Rwandan women who themselves were
part of the killing bureaucracy are also congruent with the experiences of German
women in similar positions. Although there are few recorded interviews with women in
the Schützstaffel (SS) available for comparison with Rwandan narratives, one example
is Anna Fest, who was conscripted into service as a Ravensbrück guard in 1944 and
was interviewed in the early 1990s.55 The wife of a foot soldier on the Russian front,
Fest describes feeling helpless to refuse her given work assignment for fear of
damaging her husband’s standing and safety in the army.
Throughout extensive discussions, Fest continuously describes herself as naı̈ve, or
as having blinders on, for not wanting to see that although no women under her guard
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died while she worked at Ravensbrück (a fact that appears to be historically accurate),
the conditions there were designed to slowly annihilate inmates.56 Only after Fest was
subjected to a 100-mile ‘‘death march’’ in 1945 did she come to see the goals of the Final
Solution as they really were and to rebel against them by assisting victims and publicly
accusing the SS officer in charge of murder. Fest’s commentary recalls the themes
inherent in the narrative of Respondent 9, a low-level Rwandan government official
(cellule leader) in 1994 who admits to having detained and guarded neighbors who
were rounded up and eventually killed by Interahamwe leaders from another part of
her city. Although Respondent 9 herself never harmed anyone personally, she turned
over her charges to the killers without protest, reportedly ‘‘not realizing’’ what would
happen to them once she did. After this incident, Respondent 9 reports, she felt
shocked and despondent. She spent the rest of the genocide hiding a group of targeted
children in her home; all of them went on to survive into adulthood.

Conclusion
As the international community (outside of a handful of courageous African nations)
fails to intervene in known episodes of genocide that continue at the time of this
writing,57 statesmen, academics, and human-rights workers have accelerated the
public debate on approaches to genocide prevention that might prove more effective in
current and future conflicts. However, this discussion has tended to conflate long-term
efforts toward primary prevention of genocide (what The Responsibility to Protect
calls studying and addressing the contributory root causes of catastrophic violence)
with emergency military, diplomatic, and economic ‘‘prevention’’ at the point when
large-scale atrocities have already begun (‘‘reaction to catastrophic violence,’’ in the
language of The Responsibility to Protect).58 This mixing of terminology has confused
the discussion of genocide prevention, to its detriment, and has focused the
international community on crises that are already out of control by the time adequate
attention is paid. Regrettably, late-phase approaches—although necessary—have not
been effective in preventing genocide in such countries as Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sudan,
and it is apparent that new strategies for the prevention of catastrophic violence are in
order. The introduction of sociological tools that predict societies at high risk for
catastrophic violence now makes it possible to target vulnerable societies years in
advance of an emergency.59 The science of public health is uniquely situated to enter
this discussion with synergistic, longer-range, primary approaches to violence
prevention that have proved durable over the past twenty years.
The objective of the ARC-G agenda is to identify attitudinal patterns among
potential genocide perpetrators that may be amenable to modification, years in
advance of provocations by genocidal governments. The data presented here
demonstrate that it is possible, in a retrospective sample of genocide perpetrators, to
ascertain the attitudes and beliefs that drive average citizens to tacitly support,
actively encourage, or thoroughly involve themselves in genocidal violence. In the
immediate next steps of the ARC-G agenda, researchers will attempt to ascertain,
through similar methods in real time, the attitudes and beliefs that drive individuals
who are currently involved in episodes of extreme violence.
However, no effort of primary genocide prevention, no matter how long-range,
can be successful without targeting women and girls, as well as men and boys, in
well-researched programs of attitudinal change. The fact that women and girls suffer
the highest casualties during episodes of collective armed conflict has been
demonstrated by a growing body of recent scholarship.60 In spite of this, the critical
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role of women in supporting, promoting, and perpetrating episodes of collective
violence must not be overlooked. Women create nurturing environments for husbands,
sons, and brothers to rejuvenate from the trauma of mass killing and, in so doing,
may be seen as complicit in this crime.61 Women cheer on killers from the sidelines.
Women are likely to be the main perpetrators of property crimes against targeted
victims across genocidal outbreaks. Ultimately, a small percentage of women have
participated in hands-on assault and murder in all documented instances of
genocide.62
The societal pressures that drive women and girls to participate in genocide are
by no means identical to those that drive men and boys within the same society.63
Health-education campaigns targeting violence prevention will succeed in proportion
to how well the pressures pushing each segment of the population are understood
and how carefully health messages are crafted to reach each individual sector of
the community. It is not difficult to imagine crafting long-range educational programs
targeting female as well as male civilians in order to engender attitudes and behaviors
that are resistant to provocation by genocidal governments when disaster strikes.
Along similar lines, it is also possible to envision crafting media broadcasts targeted
specifically at relatively homebound women during times of national catastrophe,
in order to supply them with accessible information, balanced reportage, and
strategies for successful resistance to the pressure to engage in human-right abuses
and crimes.
The data on women’s tendency toward more ‘‘gender-consonant’’ crimes such as
looting or denouncement have not been explored fully with respect to genocide but
have been the subject of extensive research in other settings where women commit
crimes. This may prove a promising avenue of research, in that there is a substantial
body of literature to draw on for future genocide-prevention initiatives targeted at
the very much neglected population of young and older women who are drawn into
all aspects of extreme population-based violence.
Finally, it is important to add that the approaches put forward by the ARC-G
research agenda are designed to be synergistic with other later-phase military,
diplomatic, and economic approaches to genocide prevention and cessation. The
necessary and sufficient structural conditions that predispose societies to outbreaks
of catastrophic violence have been discussed elsewhere64 and will be repeated
here only to point out that, from the broadest perspective, genocide is considered a
crime of governments against their citizens. However, while non-democratic governments may incite their populations to attack unarmed civilians, and specific social
conditions may exacerbate the inclination of groups to lash out, it is self-evident that,
in any genocide, individuals support and carry out the actual killing. The conclusion
may be drawn that any organized, scientific approach to genocide prevention will
be incomplete without a long-range strategy for transforming genocide predictors
in individuals and groups on the ground.
The data reported here represent a preliminary step in developing a more complete
understanding of the roles that young and older women play in catastrophic violence,
as well as in defining what a public-health-based approach to long-range, primary
genocide prevention might look like. The object of future inquiry will be to test whether
it is possible to apply this approach in incipient conflict zones and whether
implementation of health-education campaigns, developed from similar data in
a contemporary setting, will have the desired effect of lowering rates of violence in
high-risk jurisdictions.
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